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In this paper, we simulate the labor market effects of net immigration and emigration during 
the 1990’s in all OECD countries. To accomplish this, we are the first to employ a 
comprehensive database of migrant stocks, grouped by education level and country of 
origin/destination, for the years 1990 and 2000. Due to the much higher international mobility 
of college graduates, relative to all other individuals, we find that net migration flows are 
college-intensive, relative to the population of non-migrants. Using the consensus aggregate 
model of labor demand and supply we simulate the long-run employment and wage effects of 
immigration and emigration. We use a range of parameter values spanning most of the 
estimates in the literature. In all cases we find that immigration had a positive effect on the 
wage of less educated natives. It also increased or left the average native wages unchanged 
and had a positive or no effect on native employment. To the contrary, emigration had a 
negative effect on the wage of less educated native workers and it contributed to increase 
within country inequality in all OECD countries. These results still hold true when we correct 
for the estimates of undocumented immigrants, for the skill-downgrading of immigrants, when 
we focus on immigration from non-OECD countries, and when we consider preliminary 
measures of more recent immigration flows for the period 2000-2007. 
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Immigration rates in OECD countries are larger than in the rest of the world and they
increased signiﬁcantly in the last 20 years. As of 2000, about 7.7% of the adult residents in
OECD countries were born in another country, versus only 2.9% in the average world country
(Freeman, 2006). Since then, the number of foreign-born individuals has further increased.
In 2009 about 10% of the OECD resident population was estimated to be foreign-born1.T h e
common representation of migration ﬂows portrays a multitude of uneducated individuals,
coming from poor countries, trying to gain access to the labor markets and welfare systems of
rich countries. This phenomenon, the simplistic view continues to emphasize, contributes to
depress wages and it produces job losses for the less educated natives, a group of workers that
has under-performed in the labor markets during the last 20 years. The available data and
recent analysis (e.g. Docquier and Marfouk, 2006; Grogger and Hanson, 2011), however, are
uncovering a diﬀerent picture of international migrants. First, a large part of the mobility to
OECD countries is from other OECD countries (about 4% of the 7.7% foreign-born residents
of OECD countries in 2000 were from another OECD country). Second, the share of college
educated individuals among immigrants is usually larger than the share of college educated
workers among natives within the receiving country. In some OECD countries the percentage
of college educated workers among immigrants is much larger than among natives (up to 4-5
times).
Our paper documents these features by using a new database that combines original
Census data for 76 receiving countries in 2000 and 61 receiving countries in 1990. We use
this dataset to measure (or estimate in the case of the missing host countries) bilateral net
immigration and emigration ﬂows of all OECD countries in the 1990’s. The data distinguish
between college-educated and non college-educated migrants, and we also diﬀerentiate net
ﬂows for each bilateral relation between each OECD country and any other country in the
world. These data are new and they are described in detail in Docquier et al. (2010). This
paper is the ﬁrst that uses this data source in order to analyze the impact of migrants. This
constitutes a substantial improvement over Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Docquier et al.
(2009), especially in the construction of net emigration data from OECD countries because
our data include more than double the number of receiving countries.
Using these data and aggregate models of the national economies and labor markets we
simulate the employment and wage eﬀects of immigration and emigration on non-moving
nationals of each OECD country. We use an aggregate production-function based model,
which has become popular in the labor literature analyzing the national eﬀects of immigration
(Borjas 2003; D’Amuri et al., 2010; Ottaviano and Peri, forthcoming, Manacorda et al.,
forthcoming). Macroeconomic studies studying growth, productivity and the skill premium
in the US and other countries have also used a similar framework (e.g. Acemoglu and
Zilibotti 2001, Caselli and Coleman 2006, Card and Lemieux 2001, Goldin and Katz 2008).
This basic framework enables us to derive a labor demand by skill group and we add a simple
labor supply decision that generates an aggregate supply curve for each skill group.
The facts about migration mentioned above have clear implications on the potential
eﬀects of immigration and emigration. First, as OECD countries are important sources as
1These ﬁgures are from OECD (2011).
2well as destinations for many of the recent world migrants, we need to analyze the potential
labor market eﬀects of both ﬂows. Should OECD countries be concerned with the domestic
labor market eﬀects of either of them? Second, if migrants have a large share of college
graduates, immigration can actually help wages and employment of less educated (through
complementarity) and possibly also average wages (through human capital externalities).
To the contrary, emigration may hurt them. Immigrants in Barcelona or Athens are more
visible to the European public eye than the Spanish or Greek engineers in Silicon Valley,
but are they more harmful to the labor market options of Spanish and Greek workers with
low education? While there are many studies on the labor market eﬀects of immigration
on individual OECD countries there is only a handful of studies on the labor market eﬀects
of emigration. This asymmetric view may lead to misconceptions of the economic eﬀects of
migration. The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of global labor movements in the
1990’s on the wages of those who did not migrate.
The existing estimates of the labor market eﬀe c t so fi m m i g r a n t sa r eo f t e ns e e na sd i ﬀeren-
tiated or even as conﬂicting with each other2. Most of the disagreement, however, is relative
to the US labor markets and it is limited to moderate diﬀerences in the wage impact of im-
migrants on less educated workers. We take a diﬀerent approach here. We capture the range
of disagreement across economists with diﬀerent estimates of the fundamental parameters of
our labor market model. In particular, diﬀerent choices of the elasticity of relative demand
between college and non-college educated and between native and immigrant workers as well
as diﬀerences in the strength of human capital externalities can be varied to produce diﬀerent
scenarios. Those can be associated with pessimistic, intermediate, and optimistic views of
the labor market eﬀects of immigrants. Without taking any stand on the current debate we
will show what range of eﬀects one obtains by allowing the whole reasonable spectrum of
parameter estimates.
Are there some common ﬁndings irrespective of the parameter choice? The answer is yes,
because some general results emerge from these simulations. First, in general, over the period
1990-2000 immigration had a small positive or no eﬀect on the average wages of non-migrant
natives in all the OECD countries. These eﬀects were, usually, positively correlated with the
immigration rate of the country (the size of immigrant ﬂow relative to the population). They
ranged from 0 to +4%. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which adopted immigration
policies explicitly selecting in favor of highly educated, had signiﬁcant positive wage gains
from immigration for natives. However, also countries such as Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus,
the United Kingdom, and Switzerland (which did not explicitly select their immigrants
based on education) experienced positive average wage eﬀects between 1 to 3%. Second,
immigration had even more beneﬁcial eﬀects on wages of non-college educated workers in
OECD countries. These eﬀects ranged between 0 and +6%. For some countries, such as
Ireland, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, and Switzerland, the eﬀects are in the 2-4%
range. Only Austria, Denmark, Italy, Japan and Greece show estimated eﬀects on the
wages of less educated (in the most pessimistic scenario) that are close to 0. A corollary of
this result is that immigration reduced the wage diﬀerential between more and less educated
natives.T h i r d ,e m i g r a t i o n ,t ot h ec o n t r a r y ,h a dan e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on wages of
2The estimates in Borjas (2003) and Card (2001, 2009) are considered as spanning the range between the
more pessimistic and more optimistic views of the labor market eﬀects of immigrants.
3less educated natives ranging between 0 and -7%. In countries like Cyprus, Ireland and New
Zealand, less educated workers suﬀered a wage decrease between 3 and 6% due to emigration
of the highly skilled. Even in Portugal, United Kingdom, South Korea, Latvia, and Slovenia
less educated suﬀered losses between 1 and 2% because of emigration.
All three results logically proceed from the nature of measured migrant ﬂows from 1990 to
2000. OECD countries have experienced both immigration and emigration ﬂows of workers
that were more “college-intensive” than their domestic labor force. Under these conditions,
immigration is associated with average wage gains of less educated workers. Emigration, to
the contrary, induces average wage losses for less educated non-migrants.
As the skill composition of migrants is crucial in determining our relative and average
wage results, we attempt to correct for the “eﬀective” skill content of immigrants in a series
of checks. First, we use estimates of the extent of illegal immigration (from the recent
“Clandestino” study, performed in several European countries) to correct for the inﬂows of
undocumented migrants. Second, we account for the potential “downgrading” of immigrants’
skills in the host countries’ labor market, by using their occupational choice as of 2000. Third,
we focus on immigration from non-OECD countries which is often portrayed as particularly
low skilled. All corrections reduce the percentage of “eﬀective” highly educated immigrants in
OECD countries. However, none of them eliminates or reverses the general picture described
above: when immigration changed the educational composition of residents, it changed it
by increasing the share of college educated (highly skilled). Finally we re-do the exercises
for a subset of countries for which we have provisional net immigration data for the 2000s
(2000-2007). We choose some European countries that received large immigration ﬂows
(including Luxembourg, Spain and Greece which were very large receivers of immigrants),
and the United States. For these countries data from the EU Labor Force Survey or from
the American Community Survey are available. They are based on smaller samples relative
to the censuses and hence subject to larger measurement errors. Even in this case, however,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of the more recent immigration ﬂows are between zero and positive
for all countries. For Luxembourg, the biggest recipient of immigrants in this period, they
can be as large as +6% for less educated. For Spain, usually considered as the country most
aﬀected by immigrants in the 2000’s, the wage eﬀect on less educated natives range between
0a n d+ 2 % . 3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple aggregate
production and labor supply framework from which we derive wages and employment ef-
fects of exogenous immigration and emigration shocks. Section 3 describes the data, their
construction, the main sources, and it shows some simple summary statistics about the ed-
ucational structure of labor force and migrant data. Section 4 presents the basic results
of the simulated wage eﬀects of immigrants using our model and the range of parameters
available from the literature. Section 5 considers the wage eﬀect when accounting for undoc-
umented workers, for downgrading of skills, looking at non-OECD immigrants, and using
3In the Appendix C, we also account for sluggish capital adjustment in the short-run (rather than assume
perfectly elastic capital supply), using estimates of the speed of adjustment from the literature. In this
case, Spain and Cyprus exhibit a negative short-run impact on wage of less educated, when accounting for
downgrading, undocumented and slow capital adjustment. The eﬀects are between -1 and -2%. For all
other countries experiencing net immigration, the short-run eﬀect on wages of less educated are very small
(between -0.5 and +0.5%) and for Luxembourg they are still positive at +2.2%.
4the preliminary data on net immigration in the 2000’s. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
We construct a simple aggregate model of an economy where the workers in the labor force
are diﬀerentiated by their place of birth (native versus foreign born) as well as their educa-
tion and skill levels (high versus low)4. This structure allows us to examine the wage and
employment eﬀects of immigration of foreign workers into the country and emigration of na-
tive workers to other countries as these movements shift the relative composition of workers
of diﬀerent education levels. The model shows that the main eﬀects of migration patterns
on employment levels and wages of non-migrant natives depend crucially on the size and
the educational composition of immigrants and emigrants relative to the non-migrants as
well as the parameters of the model. The key parameters are the elasticities of substitution
across workers of diﬀerent nationalities and education levels and the elasticity of native labor
supply.
2.1 Aggregate production function
The prevalent models in the literature (Borjas 2003, Card 2001, Ottaviano and Peri forth-
coming) are based on a production function where the labor aggregate is a nested constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation of diﬀerent types of workers. In the production
function (where country subscripts are omitted for simplicity), we assume that output (de-
noted by ) is produced with a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function
with two factors, physical capital (), and a composite labor input ()5:
 = e 
1−
 (1)
The term e  is the total factor productivity (TFP) parameter, and  i st h ei n c o m es h a r eo f
labor.
Assuming that physical capital is internationally mobile and that each single country is
too small to aﬀect global capital markets, returns to physical capital are equalized across
countries. If ∗ denotes the international net rate of return to capital, the following arbitrage
condition implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio in the economy:

∗ =( 1− ) e 
−
 (2)
The condition above holds both in the short and the long run in a small open economy.
In a closed economy, as in Ramsey (1928) or Solow (1956), condition (2) holds on the
long-run balanced growth path, with ∗ as a function of the inter-temporal discount rate of
individuals (or of the savings rate)6. We substitute this arbitrage condition into (1) to obtain
4Even though there are clear and important diﬀerences between skill or education, they are used inter-
changeably in this section. High-skilled (low-skilled) or highly educated (less educated) are equivalent. In
the next section, we use tertiary education as the proxy for high-skilled.
5All variables are relative to a speciﬁcy e a r ,. We omit the subscript for compactness of notation.
6As long as immigration does not change the saving rate of an economy, the pre- and post-migration ∗
will be identical.
5an expression of aggregate output as a linear function of the aggregate composite labor :
 =  (3)
In this expression,  ≡ e 1 [(1 − )∗]
(1−) is an increasing function of TFP and is
referred to as modiﬁed TFP. The production function (3) can be viewed as an aggregate
production function in which inputs (workers) are adjusted instantly. Long-run and short
run eﬀe c t so fac h a n g ei nl a b o rs u p p l ya r et h es a m ea st h e r ea r en o“ s l o w l y ”a c c u m u l a t i n g
factors. Alternatively, equation (3) can be interpreted as the reduced long-run version of a
function with capital accumulation. In the long-run (balanced growth path) analysis, the two
interpretations are equivalent. Our simulation exercise assumes that capital is immediately
adjusted (constant interest rate). In Appendix C, we provide simulation results with a ﬁxed
capital stock for comparison.
Many papers in the labor (Katz and Murphy 1992, Card and Lemieux 2001, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti 2001) and growth (Caselli and Coleman 2006) literatures assume that labor in














where  and 1 −  are the productivity levels of highly-educated workers (college level
or above) and less educated workers (non-college). The parameter  is the elasticity of
substitution between these two types of workers.
W en e x td i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nn a t i v e sa n di m m i g r a n t sw i t h i ne a c he d u c a t i o ns p e c i ﬁcl a -
bor aggregate,  and . If native and immigrant workers of education level  =( ) were
perfectly substitutable, the economy-wide aggregate  would simply be equal to the sum of
the native and immigrant labor supplies. However, native and immigrant workers of similar
education levels may diﬀer in several respects. First, immigrants have skills, motivation,
and tastes that may set them apart from natives. Second, in manual and intellectual work,
they may have culture-speciﬁc skills and limitations such as limited knowledge of the lan-
guage or culture of the host country. Third, immigrants tend to concentrate in occupations
diﬀerent from those mostly chosen by natives because of diaspora networks, information
constraints and historical accidents. In particular, new immigrants tend to cluster dispro-
portionately in those sectors or occupations where previous migrant cohorts are already
over-represented. Several papers (Card, 2009; D’Amuri et al. 2010; Ottaviano and Peri,
forthcoming; Manacorda et al., forthcoming) ﬁnd imperfect degrees of substitution between
natives and immigrants. Hence, we assume that both highly-educated () and less-educated
labor aggregates () are both nested CES functions of native and immigrant labor stocks












where  =  (5)
where  is the number of type- native workers,  is the number of type- immigrant
workers, and  is the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrant workers.
Finally,  and 1 −  are the relative productivity levels of native and immigrant workers,
respectively.
62.2 Schooling externalities
We introduce the existence of positive externalities from highly skilled workers in the same
spirit as several recent papers (see Acemoglu and Angrist 2000, Ciccone and Peri 2006,
Moretti 2004a, 2004b, and Iranzo and Peri 2009 as recent examples). There is a large
body of literature (beginning with Lucas 1988, and extending to Azariadis and Drazen 1990,
Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Cohen and Soto 2007, and Vandenbussche et al. 2009) that
emphasizes the role of human capital on technological progress, innovation and growth of
GDP per capita. The main implication is that TFP is an increasing function of the schooling
level in the labor force. Such formulation is particularly appropriate for our model. Following
the expressions used in Moretti (2004a, 2004b), the TFP is expressed as follows ,
 = 0
 (6)
where 0 captures the part of TFP that is independent of the human capital externality;
 ≡
+
+++ is the fraction of highly educated individuals in the labor force (where
 is the total number of individuals with education  and nativity-status  in working age),7
and  is the semi-elasticity of the modiﬁed TFP to . Throughout the paper, upper-case
characters denote total working-age population whereas lower-case letters (such as )a r e
individuals who are actually employed. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) as well as Iranzo and
Peri (2009) use a similar formulation to express schooling externalities and we use their
estimates for the parameter .
2.3 Labor Demand
Each country is a single labor market. We derive the marginal productivity for native workers
of both education levels ( and ) by substituting (4) and (5) into (3) and taking the
derivative with respect to the total quantity of labor  and  respectively. This yields























By taking the logarithm of the demand functions above and calculating the total diﬀer-
entials of each one of them with respect to inﬁnitesimal variations (∆) of the employment of
each type of worker, we obtain the percentage change in marginal productivity in response
to employment changes. In particular, the percentage change of marginal productivity for
native workers of education level  =( ) in response to a percentage change in employment
of immigrant (∆ and ∆) and native (∆ and ∆) workers can
be written as follows:8
7We assume that the schooling externality is a function of the proportion of the college educated working
age population, and they represent the total pool of potential workers in the long-run. In practice this
number is very close to the proportion of the college educated workers in the actual labor force but this
structure simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.











































+ ∆ for  =( )
In equation (9), the terms  represent the share of the wage bill going to workers of
education level  =( ) and place of origin  =( ) The ﬁrst term in the summation
captures the eﬀect of changes in the employment of each group on the marginal productivity
of natives of type  through the term  i nt h ew a g ee q u a t i o n . T h es e c o n dt e r mi nt h e
summation, which depends only on the change in supply of workers of the same education
type (natives or immigrants), is the impact on marginal productivity of natives of type 
through the terms  in the wage equation. The term − 1

∆




 .T h eﬁnal term ∆ is the eﬀect of a potential change in education intensity,
measured as a change in the share of the college educated in the working-age population,
through the total factor productivity level .
2.4 Labor supply
A native worker of education level  =( ) chooses how to split one unit of labor endowment
between work  and leisure 1 −  to maximize an instant utility function,9 which depends






The parameters  ,  and  (≥ ) can be speciﬁc to the education level  but we consider
them to be identical across groups for simplicity. In production function (3), individuals
consume all their labor income which leads to the budget constraint  = . Substituting
this constraint into the utility function and maximizing with respect to  we obtain the labor










is a constant and  = 
− = 0 captures the elasticity of household labor
supply. Since there are  working age individuals among all workers of education level 
the aggregate labor supply of that type is given by:
 = 

 for  =( ) (11)
9The model with savings and capital accumulation could be solved with the alternative utility function
 =
1− exp(−)−1
1− as an inter-temporal optimization model. In that case, which is illustrated at page 422-25
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) the labor supply along a balanced growth path does not depend on wages.
Consumption would be a constant fraction of income and, along a balanced growth path wages would be
growing at the rate of e . Hence it would be a special case with perfectly inelastic individual labor supply.
8As described above,  is the wage paid to a native worker of schooling ;  (deﬁned
in section 2.2) is the working-age population in group ;  > 0 is the elasticity of labor supply
and  is a constant.
For immigrants, we make a further simpliﬁcation by assuming that all immigrants at
working age supply a constant amount of labor (call it   0)s ot h a tt o t a le m p l o y m e n to f
immigrants is given by  =  for  =( ) This is equivalent to the assumption that
employment levels of immigrants are not responsive to changes in wages. It is also equivalent
to considering the immigration level as exogenous while tracking its labor market impact on
natives and is the standard approach in the labor literature when analyzing the impact of
immigration on native workers (e.g. in Borjas 2003, Borjas and Katz 2007, Ottaviano and
Peri, forthcoming).
2.5 Equilibrium eﬀect of exogenous immigration and emigration
Exogenous changes in the working-age foreign-born population (∆ and ∆)a n di n
the working-age native population (∆ and ∆)a r ew h a tw ec a l ln e ti m m i g r a t i o na n d
net emigration. They generate changes in the marginal productivity of native workers as
well as changes in their supply. In the new equilibrium, each of the two labor markets (for
highly-educated and less-educated native workers) respond to these ﬂows and adjust to new
wage and employment levels.
For compactness, we deﬁne b  = ∆ a st h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g eo fa n yv a r i a b l e.C o n -
sidering an immigration “shock” represented by b  a n da ne m i g r a t i o n“ s h o c k ”r e p r e s e n t e d
by b  for  =( ), the following two conditions (for each labor market) represent the






























b  − b 
´
for  =( ) (13)
The new equilibrium is obtained by equating the percentage wage changes in the demand
and supply of native labor within each market and solving for b 
Let b 
 denote the exogenous impact of immigra t i o no nt h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c t i v i t yo f
native workers of education level . Its value is obtained by setting b  =0in the labor




















b  + ∆
¸
for  =( ) (14)
After solving the system of equations in (12) and (13), we obtain the following two linear
equations in two unknown variables that summarize the equilibrium in each labor market






























b  =0 (16)
In expression (15), the ﬁrst two terms b 
 +

 b  represent the shift (in percentage
terms) of the intercept of the logarithmic demand function for native workers of education
level  while 1
 b  is the (negative of) the change in the intercept of the logarithmic supply











is the (absolute value) of the slope of the logarithmic demand function for native workers of
type  while 1
 is the slope of the logarithmic supply for the same workers.11
The interactions between the two markets ( and )a r i s ef r o mt h ef a c tt h a tac h a n g ei n
employment of workers with schooling level  aﬀects the marginal productivity of, and hence
the demand for, workers of schooling level  through the term

 b  In turn, employment in
the  market aﬀects the productivity (and demand) for workers of type  (through

 b ).
Solving the system (15)-(16) with respect to b  and b , we obtain the following equilibrium
changes in employment and wages of natives in response to immigration and emigration and










































































 − b 
´
for  =( ) (19)
2.6 Special cases
Two extreme cases are of interest when deﬁning the boundaries of potential wage and em-
ployment eﬀects. If wages are perfectly ﬂexible and supply of workers is perfectly inelastic
( = ), the whole eﬀect of immigration and emigration shocks accrues to wages. This is
a reasonable scenario, especially in the long-run, and it is the one considered in most analyses
(such as Borjas 2003). In such a case, there is no endogenous response of native employment
10Correspondingly, in equation (16) the term b 
+

 b  is the shift in labor demand for native workers
of schooling  and 1
 b  is the negative of the change in labor supply for those workers.










 is the (absolute value of) the slope of the logarithmic
demand for native workers of schooling  while 1
 is the slope of their logarithmic supply.



























b  + ∆ for  =( )
A tt h eo p p o s i t ee x t r e m eo ft h es p e c t r u m ,t h ew a g e sc o u l db ec o m p l e t e l yr i g i ds ot h a t
any change in immigration is absorbed by changes in employment levels. In this case, there
is no wage impact of immigration and the employment response of natives to the inﬂow of





























An assumption of full wage rigidity in the long-run, however, creates many inconsistencies
since most estimates imply the elasticity of labor supply to wages is much closer to zero than
to inﬁnity. Thus, this scenario should be viewed as a theoretical exercise.
3 Description of the New Data-Set
3.1 Net migration data: sources and deﬁnitions
The relevant migration ﬂows to be used in our analysis are net immigration and emigration
ﬂows, namely gross ﬂows of immigrants and emigrants net of returnees. The ﬁgures for
immigrants are calculated using the stock of foreign-born individuals (or foreign nationals)
for each country in two diﬀerent years (1990 and 2000) and taking the diﬀerence between
the two. The ﬁgures for emigrants are calculated for each country of origin by aggregating
the stock of people living in other countries in two diﬀerent years and taking the diﬀerence
between the two.
There are several sources documenting yearly migration ﬂows by receiving country (e.g.
OECD International Migration Database, UN migration statistics) but those only include
gross inﬂow of people in a country and they do not correct for migrants who leave or go back
to their country of origin. Moreover they never record undocumented migrants and they
often record immigrants when they achieve their resident status rather than when they ﬁrst
enter the country. Most importantly for our purposes, those data do not have information on
the education level of migrants. The ﬂows of immigrants to a country can only be recovered
by measuring the stock of foreign born people in a destination country (from a certain origin
country) at diﬀerent points in time and then taking the diﬀerence. The other advantage of
using data on stocks of migrants is that they are from national censuses which tend to be
11more representative, more accurate and more complete than other data sources. Censuses
(i) often account for undocumented immigrants at least in some countries like the US, (ii)
they categorize immigrants by place of birth, rather than nationality which can change over
time and across countries due to naturalization laws and (iii) report their education levels.
Our database was constructed by two of the authors and is described in greater detail
in Docquier et al. (2010).12 It consists of measures of bilateral immigrant and emigrant
stocks for 195 countries in 1990 and 2000. The starting point for the new data is the
database assembled by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) who collected the stock of foreign-
born individuals in all OECD destination countries in 1990 and 2000, by country of origin
and level of schooling (primary, secondary and tertiary), using censuses as primary data
sources. These data were supplemented with original data from the censuses of a large
number of non-OECD countries. Finally, for many destination countries with no data,
bilateral migrant stocks were predicted using a gravity framework as described in greater
detail in Docquier et al. (2010). Table A1 in the appendix shows the estimated total stock of
migrants in OECD countries, in non-OECD countries with observed data, and in non-OECD
countries with imputed data. As we can see, about 70-77% of world migrants are in countries
with census data and only 23-30% of them are in countries with imputed data. Measuring
emigration from OECD countries requires data from all the possible destination countries,
at least the most relevant ones. Emigrant stocks from a certain country of origin can only be
measured by aggregating all migrants recorded in the censuses of all destination countries.
As some important destination countries (such as Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina,
and Singapore) are outside the OECD, this new database ensures much better coverage of
emigrants from OECD countries relative to Docquier and Marfouk (2006). Table A2 in the
appendix show that the majority of emigrants from the countries considered in this study are
in destination countries for which we have actual census data.13 Less than 13% of emigrants
from most countries of origin are in countries with imputed (rather than actual) migration
data. The only countries relying on imputed data for a larger fraction of their emigrants (up
to 40%) are Israel, the Baltic States, and France.14
We distinguish two schooling types indexed by .  =  denotes college graduates (also
referred to as highly educated) and  =  denotes individuals with secondary completed or
lower education (referred to as less educated). The database covers the years 1990 and 2000
and the diﬀerences in stocks by country of origin and destination provide the measures of the
net migration ﬂows in the 1990’s. The data are relative to individuals aged 25 and over as a
proxy of the working-age population. This choice maximizes comparability between data on
migration and on labor force per educational attainment. Furthermore, it excludes a large
number of students who emigrate temporarily to complete their education or children who
migrate with their families and are not active in the labor market.
The ﬁnal data needed are the number and average education levels of working-age res-
idents in each country in our sample. The size of the adult population (i.e. population
aged 25 and over) is provided by the United Nations. Missing data in the case of several
12Further details of the construction and speciﬁc references are also in Appendix A and Table A1.
13This pattern is also conﬁrmed in Ozden et.al. (2010) which presents global bilateral migration stocks
but does not disaggregate by education levels.
14Also, for this reason we will consider Israel and the Baltic States as outliers in most of our simulations.
12small countries can be estimated using the CIA world factbook.15 Adult population data is
then split across education groups using international indicators of educational attainment.
We follow Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) in com-
bining diﬀerent data sets documenting the proportion of tertiary educated workers in the
population aged 25 and over. The main sources are De La Fuente and Domenech (2006)
for OECD countries and Barro and Lee (2010) and Cohen and Soto (2007) for non-OECD
countries. In the remaining non-OECD countries where both Barro—Lee and Cohen—Soto
data are missing (about 70 countries in 2000), they apply the educational proportion of the
neighboring country with the closest tertiary education enrollment rate and the GDP per
capita.
3.2 Description and General Trends
Table 1 presents the immigration patterns during the period 1990-2000 for all the countries
considered in this study. These are all member countries of the OECD as well as several non-
OECD countries in Eastern Europe. Columns 1 and 2 show immigration rates in total pop-
ulation and among college educated. Columns 3 and 4 show immigration rates, considering
only non-OECD countries of origin, also distinguished between total and College-educated.
Immigration rates, in column 1 of Table 1 are calculated as net inﬂow of immigrants (age
25 and older) during the period 1990-200016 divided by the initial working-age population
in 1990. For instance, during this time period, the net inﬂow of immigrants was equal to
14.35% of the 1990 population in Israel. This large level is a consequence of the removal of
the emigration restrictions in a very unstable Soviet Union in the early 1990s.17 A less well
known fact is that Luxembourg, Austria, and Ireland also received signiﬁcant inﬂows of im-
migrants relative to their populations. The total rates range between 7.6 and 12.5%. Three
countries at the bottom of the table are also worth mentioning. The three Baltic countries
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union, experienced
massive negative net immigration ﬂows. This was a result of the return migration of many
ethnic Russians back to Russia, after having immigrated to these Baltic countries during the
Soviet era. Several other Eastern European countries (e.g. Romania, Slovenia, Hungary and
Poland) had similar experiences during this period.
The second column of Table 1 presents the net immigration rates for College educated
workers, referred to as “highly educated”. These are calculated as the net change (between
1990 and 2000) in the stock of college educated foreign-born workers (∆)r e l a t i v et o
the similarly educated resident population in 1990. Two interesting patterns are worth
emphasizing. First, in all countries with positive net immigration rates, (with the exception
of Austria), the immigration rates of the college educated were larger than the rates for the
total population. In some prominent destinations such as Israel, Ireland, Iceland, Canada,
Australia and the United Kingdom, the immigration rates for college educated workers were
more than twice the overall immigration rates. Immigration, therefore, contributed to a
signiﬁcant increase in the share of college educated individuals in the resident population
15See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
16This is denoted by ∆ + ∆ using the notation of the model in section (2).
17There are several studies analyzing the economic impact of this episode on Israel’s economy such as
Friedberg (2001), Cohen-Goldberg and Pasermann (forthcoming).
13for all countries in our sample (again with the exception of Austria). Second, Latvia and
Estonia had negative immigration rates, implying large returns of immigrants and even larger
return rates for college educated. Remarkably, columns 3 and 4 conﬁrm the pattern of larger
immigration rates for college educated individuals, even when we consider only immigrants
from non-OECD countries. Most countries have higher rates for college immigration than
for total immigration even from non-OECD countries and countries like Canada, Australia,
and the UK attract very college-intensive ﬂo w so fm i g r a n t sf r o mo u t s i d et h eO E C D .
Table 2 presents the emigration rates for the countries in our sample where Column 1
is the total emigration rate, calculated as the net outﬂow of natives (25 year and older)
during the period 1990-2000 (∆+∆) relative to the total resident population (again
age 25 and above) in 1990. Column 2 contains the net emigration rate of college-educated
natives. A negative emigration rate implies that the return rate of emigrants (natives who
were already abroad in 1990) was larger than the outﬂow of new emigrants during the
period 1990-2000. Countries are ranked in decreasing order of their college emigration rates.
Few observations are in order. First, as in the case of immigration, emigration rates are
also larger for college educated natives than on average (with the exception of Israel). For
some small countries (Cyprus, Malta, and Ireland), a large emigration rate for the college
educated is associated with negative overall emigration rates, implying large rate of return
for non-college educated natives from abroad. In some of these small countries, however,
immigration of tertiary educated foreign born workers compensated the emigration of the
natives. Second, several Eastern European countries (such as Poland, Romania, Slovenia,
and Slovakia) and some western European countries (Portugal and Greece) had signiﬁcant
college educated emigration ﬂows, that were not compensated by similar immigration inﬂows.
For those countries, emigration was a signiﬁcant source of change in the supply of highly
educated workers in the overall labor supply. Other European countries such as the United
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands had signiﬁcant rates of college-
educated emigration but were compensated with signiﬁcant immigration from mostly non-
OECD countries. Third, the United States, Canada, and Australia were, as is widely known,
mainly destination countries as the immigration rates (total and for highly educated) were
much larger than the corresponding emigration rates of the natives. In summary, during the
1990s both the immigration and emigration ﬂows were very skill-intensive in most OECD
countries. Less well-known, but clearly visible in our data, many countries experienced
emigration rates that were just as large as immigration rates.
4 Simulated labor-market eﬀects
4.1 Parameterization and measurement
Our model is designed to evaluate the wage and employment eﬀects of migration patterns
on non-migrant natives. As one can see from equations (17)-(19), we need three key sets
of variables for each country in order to determine these eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the share of
the wage income that accrues to each of the four main groups in the labor force as of 1990.
As mentioned in the previous section, these groups are denoted as ,w h e r e is the
14education level and  is the country of birth.18 The second variable is the percentage change
in employment among each of these four groups due to immigration and emigration during
the decade 1990-2000. This is denoted by b . The last variable is the change in the ratio
of college educated individuals in the labor force, again due to immigration and emigration,
which we denote by ∆
T h es h a r e so fw a g ei n c o m ea c c r u i n gt od i ﬀerent groups of workers depend on their em-
ployment levels and wages. We use their number in the working-age population as a measure
of their share in the labor force (from Docquier et al. 2010). Since there is no comprehensive
global database on wages of college educated and less educated, we proceed as follows. We
take the estimated returns to a year of schooling in each country for the year as close as
possible to 1990 from the Hendricks (2004) database.19 We then calculate the average years
of education for each of the two education groups (those with and without college degrees)
using the Barro and Lee (2010) database. We multiply the return on education with the
diﬀerence between average years of schooling of the two groups to identify the college wage
p r e m i u mi nag i v e nc o u n t r y .T h e n ,f r o ms e v e r a ld i ﬀerent sources (most of which are reviewed
in Kerr and Kerr, 2009), we obtain the country-speciﬁc estimate of the native-foreign wage
premium to adjust the wages of immigrants at each level of education. If any of the data are
not available for a speciﬁc country, we use the estimate for the geographically closest country
with the most similar income per capita. Multiplying the group-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n tb yt h e
group-speciﬁc wage (standardized for the wage of less educated natives) we obtain the wage
bill for that group. When divided by the total wage bill, this number provides the share
. These shares of wage income for each of the four groups in each country are reported in
Table A3 of the appendix. The percentage change in the employment of each group during
the period 1990-2000, due to immigration and emigration, as well as the change in share
of college-educated, are calculated from the dataset on stocks of migrants in 1990-2000 as
described above.
The next critical step is the determination of the values of the four fundamental para-
meters of the model.  is the elasticity of substitution between highly- and less-educated
workers;  is the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants with the same
education level;  is the intensity of college-externalities, and  is the labor supply elasticity
of more and less educated natives.
Table 3 presents the values of the parameters chosen in each of three scenarios considered
in the numerical simulations. The values span the range found in the literature. For the
parameter , the elasticity of substitution between more and less educated workers, there are
several estimates in the literature. Johnson (1970) and Murphy et al. (1998) estimate values
around 1.30 (respectively 1.34 and 1.36); Angrist (1995), Katz and Murphy (1992), Ciccone
and Peri (2005), and Krusell et al. (2000) estimate values around 1.5-1.75 (respectively 1.47,
1.50, 1.66) and Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming) estimate a value close to 2. Hence, we use
the values 1.5, 1.75 and 2 for the three main scenarios.
The parameter , the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants, has
18Recall that each worker has two key attributes. The ﬁrst is the education level and denoted by  =( ),
where  stands for highly (or tertiary) educated and  is less educated. Second,  =( ) indicates the
country of origin, where  stands for native and  is foreign born.
19If the estimate was not available for a country we choose the estimate for the country sharing a border
with the closest level of income per capite.
15been the subject of several recent papers and has generated a certain level of debate. This
parameter is particularly crucial to determine the eﬀect of immigration on the wages of non-
migrant natives and, as we will see, the choice of this parameter inﬂuences the estimated
wage-eﬀects of migration in some countries much more than other parameters. Borjas et al.
(2008), Peri (2011), and Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming) use US data and Manacorda et
al. (forthcoming) use UK data in their estimation of .T h e ﬁrst study ﬁnds a value of
inﬁnity, the second and third estimate an elasticity between 10 and 20 and the paper on UK
data ﬁnds a value of 6. We use inﬁnity, 20, and 6 as the three parameter values in the three
scenarios.
The parameter , measuring the externality generated by the tertiary educated in the
labor force, has been estimated using data from US cities (Moretti 2004a, 2004b) or US
states (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000 and Iranzo and Peri 2009). It is also subject to a certain
level of debate since some studies ﬁnd substantial schooling externalities ( =0 75 in Moretti
2004b) while others do not ( =0in Acemoglu and Angrist 2000).
Finally, the estimates of the elasticity of labor supply  (as summarized in the review
by Evers et al (2008) for several European countries and the US) range from 0 to 0.17 (in a
study on the US by Flood and MaCurdy 1992 and on the Netherlands by van Soest et. al.
1990). Hence, we choose 0, 0.10, and 0.20 as the representative values for this parameter.
4.2 Wage eﬀects of immigration
The eﬀects of immigration, in percentage points, on the wages of less educated native workers
are shown in Figure 1.a and those on the average wages of all workers in the economy are
illustrated in Figure 1.b. We report these ﬁg u r e sa sal a r g ep a r to ft h ed e b a t eo nt h el a b o r
market eﬀects of immigration has been around the overall wage eﬀects and the eﬀects on
the least educated.20 Each ﬁgure reports the values obtained from the formulas (19) and
the three conﬁgurations of the parameters shown in Table 3 (which we refer to as the “low”,
“intermediate”, and “high” elasticity scenarios). The thin dotted line connects the estimates
from the high scenario, the thick solid line connects estimates in the intermediate scenario and
the thin dashed line connects the low scenario estimates. The numerical values corresponding
to the ﬁgures are reported in Table A4 of the Appendix. Our attention is more focused on
the less educated workers since they are usually considered to be more aﬀected from the
d i s r u p t i v el a b o rm a r k e ti m p a c to fi m m i g r a t i o nin academic studies (e.g. Borjas 2003) as well
as the public opinion. The average wage eﬀect, on the other hand, gives us a better idea about
the overall eﬀect of immigration on national income in the long run. While in Table A4 we
report the eﬀects for all 39 countries in our sample (all OECD plus the remaining European
Countries as discussed above), we drop Israel and the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia) in Figures 1.a and 1.b. Israel’s massive immigration experience, especially from
Russia in the 1990s, makes it a clear outlier. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia experienced large
negative net immigration rates, as discussed above in more detail, due to ethnic Russians
returning after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This really was more of an emigration
phenomenon in terms of the main characteristics and implications.
20The wage eﬀect on highly educated non-migrants (available upon request) are sometimes negative and
sometimes positive depending on whether the complementarity eﬀects are stronger than the externality.
16The countries are listed in decreasing order of their total 1990-2000 immigration rates as
deﬁned in Table 1. A number of interesting features immediately become clear. First, all
simulated values (with the exception of the low scenario for Austria) are positive, indicating
that in almost every case, less educated native workers gained from immigration. For some
countries with large immigration rates, such as Ireland, Canada, or Australia the gains for
the natives are quiet high and range from 4-6%. For other countries with intermediate
levels of immigration, such as Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland the eﬀects
are also non-negligible at between 1 and 2%. For most of the other countries, the estimates
are negligible and are between 0 and positive 1%. Second, the diﬀerences between the
low and the high substitution scenarios illustrate the importance of the extent of native-
immigrant substitutability and college externalities in determining the wage eﬀects. The
most pessimistic results are mainly driven by low elasticities of substitution between more
and less educated workers and the absence of human capital externalities. Third, even though
the US had high immigration rates, the less educated native workers experience one of the
lowest wage eﬀects with the estimated long-run eﬀect running between 0.3% and 1.2%.
T h em a g n i t u d eo ft h ew a g ee ﬀect critically depends on the ratio of the highly educated
to the less educated among the immigrants. Countries where laws explicitly favor more
educated immigrants (such as Australia and Canada) experience larger positive eﬀects both
for the less educated natives as well as the total workforce. Other countries without such
explicit laws (such as Ireland, UK, and Switzerland) also enjoy signiﬁcant positive eﬀects
since they continue to attract a large portion of highly educated immigrants. On the other
hand, if the skill composition of immigration ﬂows is not biased in favor of the educated,
then the net wage eﬀect on the natives becomes quite small.
T h ee c o n o m y - w i d ea v e r a g ew a g ee ﬀects in Figure 1.b mirror, qualitatively, the eﬀects
on the less educated natives as reported in Figure 1.a. However, they are quantitatively
smaller and the relative diﬀerences between the scenarios are higher. In the low scenario
(no externalities, perfect substitution between natives and immigrants, low complementarity
between more and less educated and rigid labor supply), the net average wage eﬀects are
very close to 0 for almost every country.
Countries to the right of Turkey, which include most Eastern European and Asian coun-
tries in our sample, received quite low immigration ﬂows at generally less than 1% of their
labor force during the whole decade. As expected, therefore, the wage eﬀects are also small.
Still, except for Poland which experienced negative net immigration, the eﬀects were positive
for both the overall labor force and the less educated. Countries located between Turkey
and Spain experienced intermediate immigration rates (between 1% and 3.5%) and they all
had positive wage eﬀects that range between 0% to 2% for the less educated and between
0% and 1.5% for the average worker.
4.3 Employment eﬀect of immigration
Using expressions (18) and (17), we are able to evaluate long-run eﬀects of immigration on
native employment levels. The main results for each country in our sample are shown in Fig-
ures 2.a (for the less educated) and 2.b (for the labor market as a whole). The overall eﬀects
tend to be small as the elasticity of labor supply is relatively low in the aggregate, with the
largest value set at 0.2. The general patterns of the employment eﬀects are similar to those of
17the wages from the previous section since they are also driven by increases (or decreases) in
the marginal productivity of non-migrant workers due to changes in the immigration levels.
There is an interesting additional eﬀect, driven mainly by complementarities in the model.
If immigration ﬂows are skill intensive, as it is the case in most of the destination countries
in our sample, then the less educated natives beneﬁt from the complementarities generated
by the increase in the relative share of the highly educated in the labor force. As a result,
their employment levels increase, which in turn, further beneﬁts the productivity levels of
the college educated and so on. This mechanism, however is quite limited within the range
of our simulations since the labor supply is not very elastic.
Figure 2.a shows the employment eﬀects for the less educated and Figure 2.b for aggregate
non-migrant native employment. The Figures replicate the structure and the notation of
Figures 1.a and 1.b. In the “high” scenario (see Table 3 for the parameter values), the labor
supply is inelastic, so that we observe the largest impact on wages. Hence, by assumption,
the employment eﬀect of immigration is 0. In the intermediate scenario, the value of the
labor elasticity is 0.1 and in the “low” scenario, the labor supply elasticity has the largest
v a l u ea t0 . 2 . I nt h i sl a s tc a s e ,t h et r a n s m i s s i o nf r o mc h a n g e si nm a r g i n a lp r o d u c t i v i t yt o
employment is the largest.
W h i l et h eq u a l i t a t i v ef e a t u r e so fe m p l o y m e n te ﬀects (sign and relative magnitude across
countries) are similar to the wage eﬀects, their magnitude is much smaller. The largest
eﬀects we observe are around +0.7% in the low scenario for the less educated natives in
the largest migrant receiving countries like Ireland, Australia, and Canada. We should note
that these were countries where the wage eﬀect was also the largest. Again, Austria is the
only country to have a negative eﬀect (a very small -0.05%) on employment of less educated
workers in the low scenario. Eastern European countries and others, located toward the right
hand side of the graph, that have minimal immigration, also experience minimal impact on
employment levels as expected. The employment eﬀects in the overall labor force (Figure
2.b) are smaller–as it was the case for the wage eﬀects–but show the same qualitative
patterns. Large migrant receiving countries have the largest positive eﬀect (at the maximum
level of 0.3%) and the rest of the countries experience eﬀects below 0.1%.
4.4 Wage eﬀects of emigration
Our data show that net emigration rates for some of the OECD countries were at least
as large as net immigration rates during the considered period, in particular for college-
educated workers. While the literature almost exclusively focuses on the labor market eﬀects
of immigration, one of the main contributions of this paper is the analysis of the wage impact
of these emigration ﬂows, modeling them as a decline in the supply of native workers.
Figure 3.a shows the eﬀects of the observed emigration patterns on the wages of less
educated non-migrant native adults in their countries of origin. Figure 3.b shows the same
eﬀect on the average non-migrant wages. (The actual numerical values presented in these
ﬁgures for each scenario and each country are listed in Table A6 of the appendix.) The
countries are now listed from left to right in decreasing order of the ratio of the college-
educated individuals among the emigrants, as shown in Table 2 above. Focusing on Figure
3 . a ,t h em o s ts t r i k i n go b s e r v a t i o ni st h a tt h ew a g ei m p a c ti so p p o s i t eo fw h a ti ss e e ni nt h e
previous section on the eﬀects of immigration. Net emigration involves a larger percentage
18decline of college educated workers and costs native less educated workers up to 6% of their
wage income in several OECD countries and more than 1% in many others. In countries
with large emigration rates (such as Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal)
the impact on wages of less educated natives is negative and sometimes quite large. The
range is between -1% (Portugal) and around -6% (Ireland and Cyprus depending on the
elasticity scenario). Even at intermediate rates of emigration, some countries still experience
negative eﬀects of around -1% (e.g. Latvia, South Korea, United Kingdom, and Canada).
In all cases, however, less educated workers do not gain as a consequence of emigration. The
losses are due to the foregone complementarity eﬀects and lost externalities from departure
of the college educated individuals. Even the average wage losses, shown in Figure 3.b, are
relatively large (between 1 and 3%) in the same four countries (Cyprus, Malta, Ireland and
New Zealand) and between 0 and 1% in most others. While some of the countries that
experience negative eﬀects from emigration (such as Ireland and the UK) manage to oﬀset
these eﬀects, partially or totally, with the positive eﬀects of immigration, many others fail
to do so. The simulation results presented lead us to think that the main losses for the less
educated workers in OECD countries arise from the loss of externalities that disappear with
the departure of highly educated natives to other countries, rather than the arrival of foreign
born immigrants. This is in stark contrast to the common public perception.
5E x t e n s i o n s
The analysis of the wage eﬀects of immigration on less educated natives can still be viewed as
somewhat optimistic. First, our database may not fully capture undocumented immigration
to the OECD countries, which is widely believed to include a larger proportion of less edu-
cated workers. Second, it assumes that highly educated immigrants are homogeneous and
possess the same level of human capital as native highly educated workers in the destination
labor markets. Third, it does not isolate the most controversial part of immigration, which is
that from poor countries. Fourth, it considers data from the 1990’s which misses the recent
large immigration ﬂows from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe, and from Central
America to the US. These recent immigrant cohorts are also believed to be less educated.
Finally, our simulations focus on the long-run eﬀects, while one could argue that slow capital
adjustment can result in a negative wage impact in the short run. In this section we tackle
all of these issues.
5.1 Undocumented immigrants and skill downgrading
The census data are the primary sources used to construct our stocks of immigrants. Yet
national censuses vary in their ability of measuring undocumented immigration due to a
variety of legal, economic, and political reasons. In some countries, such as the United
States and Canada, the coverage of the resident population should be complete and hence
include (possibly with some small underestimates in the order of 10%) the undocumented
immigrant population. In other countries, such as many in continental Europe, the censuses
have a harder time in properly counting the undocumented immigrants. Several countries
in Europe recently joined forces for the “Clandestino” study (European Union, 2010) which
19produced a picture of the undocumented population in 12 European Countries for the years
between 2000 and 2007. The study used several methods including surveys, data from
regularization laws and data on apprehension and expulsions of undocumented individuals,
to produce estimates of the variable , the fraction of undocumented in the total immigrant
population of country . We utilize these estimates, from around 2000 and we multiply
the inﬂow of documented (measured) immigrants over the period 1990-2000 by (1 − )
to obtain a number of imputed undocumented immigrants. Then, in order to maximize
the possible impact of undocumented immigration on our estimates, we assume that all
undocumented immigrants were less educated and we add these imputed numbers to the
corresponding groups in our database. Table A7 in the Appendix shows the upper and lower
estimates for  in all of the countries. For the European countries not covered by the study,
we assign the  of the closest country for which it is available. For non-European countries
with a census system that covers all residents, we assume that undocumented individuals are
included in our data. For Japan, South Korea, and Chile, for which we have no information,
we set the upper and lower bound of  to the average values in the sample. It is worth noting
that only in Eastern European countries, Italy, and Greece, the upper-bound estimates of
undocumented individuals reached values higher than 20% of the total immigrant population
(e.g. 30% in Czech Republic, 37% in Poland, 23% in Greece and 33% in Italy). In all other
European countries, the upper bound estimates were lower than 10%. In particular, for the
countries with the largest net inﬂows (Austria, Spain, and Ireland), the estimates ranged
between 3 and 10% only. This implies that correction for undocumented should not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the previous values.
A second reason to believe that we may be under-estimating the actual size of the un-
skilled immigrant population is due to “skill downgrading”. As shown in several studies
(such as Dustman et al., 2008 for the UK, Cohen-Goldner and Pasermann, forthcoming for
Israel as well as Mattoo, Ozden and Neagu, 2008 for the US) immigrants with intermediate
a n dh i g he d u c a t i o nt e n dt oﬁnd jobs in occupations typically staﬀed by natives with lower
level of schooling. Hence, the actual “human capital” supplied to the labor market might not
be corresponding to those indicated by their schooling level as reported in the census data.
By considering college-educated immigrants as fully equivalent to college-educated natives,
we might be over-estimating their contribution to the ratio of highly educated in the labor
force. In order to correct for this bias, we use information on the actual occupations in which
immigrants and natives are employed, by level of schooling in diﬀerent countries. The newly
collected DIOC-E Database (OECD, 2010) covers 89 destination and 233 origin countries
and contains information on the distribution of foreign-born immigrants across occupations
(according to the ISCO-88 one-digit classiﬁcation) by country of origin and schooling level
for the year 2000. Following Mattoo et al. (2008), we consider college educated workers who
are employed as managers, directors, senior oﬃcials, professionals, associate professionals,
and associate managers as “highly skilled”. These occupations include the one-digit codes
1 ,2a n d3i nt h eI S C O - 8 8c l a s s i ﬁcation. Then, we measure the frequency of workers in these
jobs among immigrants with college education (), among less educated native workers
(), and among college educated native workers (). Using these frequencies we de-
compose one highly educated immigrant worker into a linear combination of more and less
educated native workers, so that the combination matches the probability of being in a highly
skilled job. In particular, we consider one highly educated immigrant worker in country  as
20equivalent to  units of highly educated native worker and (1 − ) units of less educated
native worker where  solves the following equation: () =  ()+(1−)()  In
countries in which highly educated immigrants are as likely to be in highly skilled occupation
as natives, we would expect  =1so that highly educated immigrants are fully counted as
college-equivalents. In countries in which highly educated immigrants have similar probabil-
ity as less educated natives to be in a skilled occupation, we would expect  =0 . Hence,
highly educated natives are counted as “less educated” native equivalents. In all cases, we
obtain   0 21. The estimates for  by country are shown in Table A8. The countries
suﬀering the largest downgrading of immigrants are Cyprus, Greece and Israel where each
college educated immigrant is counted as around 0.6 college-equivalent natives.
Figures 4.a and 4.b show the simulated wage eﬀects (on less educated and average)
native workers once we account for undocumented immigrants and downgrading of their
education levels using the methods described above. The thick solid line (both in Figures
4.a and 4.b) connects the values obtained using the intermediate parameter conﬁguration
(Table 3) and accounting for downgrading plus using the lower estimate for the share of
undocumented workers. The thin solid line assumes the intermediate scenario and includes
downgrading with high estimates of undocumented. The dashed line shows the low scenario
with downgrading and high estimates of undocumented. The dashed line is really the most
pessimistic scenario we can construct with our data. Immigrants are perfect substitutes
for natives; there are no externalities; undocumented immigrants are all counted as less
educated and a part of highly educated immigrants are counted as low skilled because of their
occupations. Despite these extreme assumptions we see positive eﬀects in every Country,
with the usual exception of Austria. Less educated workers experience either no eﬀect (such
as the US, Denmark, Italy, and Greece) or positive eﬀects (as large as 3-3.5% in Ireland,
Canada, and Australia). Similarly, for average wages, the eﬀect is zero (or very close) in
several countries in the worst-case scenario (dashed line). In the intermediate scenario,
accounting for downgrading and undocumented still leaves wage gains for natives in the
order of 0.5 to 1.5% for all countries with immigration rates at least as large as Spain. These
corrections slightly attenuate the positive eﬀects of the previous section but in most cases
they do not cancel, let alone reverse, them.
5.2 Immigration from non-OECD countries
International mobility is not a phenomenon that pushes people mainly out of non-OECD
into OECD countries as the new database reveals. Table 4 shows that the total foreign-
born population in the OECD countries account for 7.7% of the resident population. Of
this total, only 3.7% of the population was born outside the OECD while 4% was born in
another OECD country. Still, as seen also in Table 4, 60% of the net ﬂow of international
migrants to OECD countries during the period 1990-2000 came from outside the OECD.
As a result, the general perception has become that the immigrants are less educated than
natives, less adequate for highly skilled jobs, and they generate the most negative eﬀects for
less educated natives in the labor market.
21In several cases, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Romania, we obtain   1. This implies that highly
educated immigrants in those countries are more likely to do highly skilled jobs.
21In Figures 5.a and 5.b, we show the simulated eﬀects on the wages of the less educated and
average worker, considering only net immigration from non-OECD countries. The countries
are listed from left to right in decreasing order of their immigration rates from non-OECD
countries. Hence the order is quite diﬀerent from Figure 1.a. Several European countries,
such as Luxembourg and Ireland, rank much lower in this ranking when compared to the
one for total immigration rates, because a very large fraction of their immigrants are from
other European (OECD) countries. On the other hand, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia
jump to the top (left) of the ranking. In terms of wage eﬀects, however, the only country
for which non-OECD immigrants appear to be quite diﬀerent in their schooling distribution
relative to OECD immigrants, thus implying diﬀerent wage eﬀects, is Luxembourg. While
total immigration had a positive impact (1 to 3%) on the less educated workers, non-OECD
immigration has a smaller (possibly negative) eﬀect between -0.10 and -0.4%. Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, Ireland, and the UK experience a positive wage gain for less educated
workers between 1 and 3%, from non-OECD immigrants. Less educated natives in the US
also experience a larger positive impact (+0.5 to 1.0%) 22 and only Austria, Luxembourg,
Denmark, and Italy experience a very small (-0.2 to -0.01%) wage loss from non-OECD
immigration. Figures 6.a and 6.b show the eﬀect of non-OECD immigration on wages,
accounting for skill downgrading (using speciﬁc non-OECD-origin downgrading coeﬃcients,
) and estimates for undocumented immigration. All wage eﬀects are still very small or
positive. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US, the UK, and Ireland experience positive
eﬀects larger than 0.5% for their less educated workers and larger than 0.2% for their average
w a g e s .T h eo t h e rc o u n t r i e se x p e r i e n c ee ﬀects between -0.1 and 0.5%.
5.3 Immigration in the 2000s
The data used so far cover migration patterns in the 1990s. Only with the collection and
dissemination of data from the 2010 censuses, the analysis of the last decade of migration
for diﬀerent education groups will be possible. The recent economic crisis, starting in 2007,
reduced net immigration rates to OECD countries drastically according to preliminary data
(e.g. Papademetriou et al. 2011 ). During the 2000-2007 period, some destination countries,
especially in Europe (mainly Spain, Italy, Greece, and Ireland) experienced immigration
rates even larger than the ones observed during the 1990s. Were these ﬂows very diﬀerent
from the previous ones? Was their composition less college-intensive? Were their eﬀects on
wages comparable to those of the 1990-2000 ﬂows? To answer these questions, we consider
net immigration to 13 European countries for the period 2000-2007 plus immigration to the
United States during the 2000-2009 period. The European Data are from the EU Labor Force
surveys, that allow us to identify adults (older than 25) by education level, separating natives
from foreign-born immigrants.23 For the US, we use the American Community Survey data
o nt h es a m ed e ﬁnition of natives and immigrants with diﬀerent education levels. Table 5
22Recall that the group of immigrants to the US with the lowest share of college graduates are Mexicans,
hence, an OECD country, while the group of immigrants with the largest share of college graduates are
Indians, hence a non-OECD country.
23We thank Francesco D’Amuri for his help with the EULFS data.
22shows the immigration rates for the 2000-200724 period for all the countries. We only included
countries for which the database includes the years 2000 as well as 2007 and for which the
relevant characteristics (age, education, and place of birth) had fewer than 10% of missing
observations. This restriction excluded the UK, Italy, and Ireland (among others). As we
see in Table 5, the country with a real boom, relative to the previous decade, was Spain with
an immigration rate of 11%. Luxembourg, Austria, and the US, the other top destination
countries in terms of rates, had lower rates than for the 1990’s. As we are excluding the crisis
period (post 2007) for the European countries, most will end up with even lower rates when
the whole decade is considered. Figures 7.a and 7.b show the simulated native wage eﬀects
(for less educated and for the average, respectively) due to immigration 2000-2007. The
countries are listed in decreasing order of total immigration rates for the 2000-2007 period.
In most cases all speciﬁcations produce positive eﬀects ranging from 0 to 2% in Figure 7.a
and between 0 and 1% in Figure 7.b. Exceptions are Luxembourg, with potentially large
positive eﬀects on less educated wages (between 3 and 7%) and Lithuania, which experienced
negative net immigration (hence emigration of foreign residents) and suﬀered a 1-2% wage
loss for less educated. One speciﬁcation (intermediate dashed line) includes the corrections
for undocumented and downgrading which somewhat reduce the gains but do not change
the overall picture.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Closing the borders to immigrants, restricting the inﬂow of people from poor countries, and
making their entry more costly and diﬃcult is sometimes presented by politicians as a way of
protecting employment and wages of domestic workers, especially those at the bottom of the
income distribution. This paper shows, using new aggregate data on migrations and a simple
aggregate model that, because college educated individuals are much more mobile than other
workers and they are likely to create opportunities for the receiving economy, immigration
is likely to help native wages and employment. We show that, in the long-run, the wage and
employment eﬀects of immigration in the 1990s and in the 2000s were rather small and always
positive for less educated workers of all OECD countries. Less educated workers in Canada,
Australia, the US, Luxembourg, the UK, and Switzerland, which were among the magnets of
international migrants, all experienced positive long-run eﬀects from immigration, between
1 and 5%, according to our calculations. To the contrary, emigration, which entails the loss
of talent and brains in much larger proportion than the loss of unskilled workers, is the
real threat for unskilled workers left behind, even in some OECD countries. Less educated
workers in Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal all lost between 1 and 6%
of their wages because of the ﬂight of highly educated emigrants. While net emigration,
especially of college educated individuals, may be a symptom of economic malaise and not
its cause, it certainly directly contributes to lower productivity and wages of the remaining
workers.
These results are surprising. Hence, we undertake a series of robustness checks. We use
estimates of the undocumented immigrants to correct for their ﬂows. Second, we account
24Immigration rates are calculated, as usual, as net immigrants during the period 2000-2007 divided by
total residents in 2000.
23for the actual occupations of highly educated immigrants to correct for skill downgrading.
Third, we consider only immigration from non-OECD countries, and fourth we restrict our
attention to migration 2000-2007. Finally, we correct for the short-run sluggish capital ad-
justment. None of the corrections eliminates or reverses (although they somewhat attenuate)
the ﬁndings of positive long-run eﬀects of immigrants on wage and employment of less ed-
ucated workers in all OECD countries. Only the short-run correction shows that, in the
short run, a few countries (Spain and Cyprus) that received very large immigration ﬂows
during the period 2000-2007 (up to 11% of their population) suﬀered small wage losses (up
to 1.4%). According to our simulations for the 2000s, less educated workers in the US expe-
rienced no wage eﬀects from immigrants in the short-run and a positive eﬀect of up to 1.2%
wage increase in the long-run.
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28A Data details
The migration data presented in Section 3 follow Docquier et al. (2010) who construct
comprehensive 195x195 matrices of bilateral migration stocks. These matrices cover the two
skill groups (college graduates and less educated individuals), and two years (1990 and 2000).
Migration is deﬁn e do nt h eb a s i so fc o u n t r yo fb i r t hw h i ch is time invariant (contrary to the
concept of citizenship, which changes with naturalization) and independent of the changes
in policies regarding naturalization. However, this deﬁnition does not account for whether
education has been acquired in the home or in the host country. This induces a potential
over-estimation of the intensity of the brain drain migration of children and students can
represent an important fraction of total immigration for certain countries.25
The methodology is described in detail in Docquier et al. (2010) and it consists of three
main steps. The starting point (step 1) is the database described in Docquier, Lowell and
Marfouk (2009), documenting bilateral migration stocks in OECD host countries. It is based
on a collection of census and register immigration data by country of birth and educational
level in the 30 OECD countries in 1990 and 2000. This OECD set of destinations does not
include the three member states which joined the OECD in 2010 (Chile, Israel, and Slovenia)
and future members (Estonia and Russia). This database characterizes the education level,
origin and destination of about 57.4 million migrants in 2000 and 40.8 million migrants
in 1990. High-skill migration represents 35.4 percent of the total in 2000 (30.1 percent in
1990). The second step consists of a collection of similar immigration data from 46 non-
OECD destinations in 2000 and 31 destinations in 1990. In the third step, data collected
in steps 1 and 2 are used to estimate the determinants of the size of bilateral migration
(
)f r o mc o u n t r y to country  in the education group  at year . Then, based on these
estimations, the size of the migrant stock from each origin country to the remaining 119
non-OECD host countries in 2000 (and 134 in 1990) for each education level is predicted.
The ﬁnal 195x195 database combines recorded migration stocks (when census and register
data are available) and out-of-sample predictions (when oﬃcial statistics are missing).
Table A1 provides summary statistics for migration stocks which are comparable with
labor force data. The database characterizes the origin, destination and education level of
about 100.5 million adult migrants in 2000, and 80.2 million in 1990. Table A2 distinguishes
observed and imputed values for immigrants to countries included in our sample. Table A3
shows stock of immigrants and emigrants in 1990 and 2000 as percentage of the skill-speciﬁc
labor force. Table A4 describes the distribution of the labor force between college graduates
and less educated as percentage of total.
25Beine et al (2007) have estimated the age-of-entry structure of high-skill immigration and proposed
alternative measures of the brain drain excluding those who left their home country before age 12, 18 or 22.
The corrected rates are obviously lower than those calculated without age-of-entryr e s t r i c t i o n s . H o w e v e r ,
the correlation between corrected and uncorrected rates is extremely high and the country rankings by
brain drain intensities are basically unaﬀected by the correction. This should mitigate concerns about child
migration possibly leading to cross-sectional biases in the brain drain estimates.
29B Derivation of the marginal productivity eﬀect
Taking the logarithmic total diﬀerential of (7) and (8) with respect to inﬁnitesimal variations


















































+ ∆ for  =( )
The equilibrium condition ensures that each type of labor is paid its marginal produc-















Hence, using the result in (24) and multiplying  by ∆ we obtain exactly each
of the four terms in the ﬁrst round bracket of (23) and we can transform them into their


































which would allow to transform the terms in the second brackets in (24) into the corre-
sponding expression of (9).
C Imperfect physical capital adjustment and short-run
eﬀects
Another extension is to account for sluggish capital adjustment in the short-run (rather than
assuming perfectly elastic capital supply), using estimates of the speed of adjustment from
the literature. Below, we explain how capital sluggishness can be accounted for in the model,
and present short-run eﬀects.
Theory With full capital adjustment to its balanced growth path equilibrium the eﬀects
of migration on wages are as described above. However, immigration in the short run may
aﬀect the capital labor ratio26  =  pushing the economy outside its balanced growth
26We use the slightly modiﬁed expression for the capital-labor ratio that includes the labor composite
(rather than employment) in the denominator.
30path. Due to slow adjustment of capital there will be an extra eﬀect of immigrants on
marginal productivity of each type of worker, through . We can re-write the expressions of
marginal productivity in (7) and (8) noting explicitly their dependence on the capital-labor
ratio:
























On the balanced growth path (or in an open economy) the capital-labor ratio is constant









 = ∗: it does not depend on the
inﬂows and outﬂows of migrants. In that case expressions (25) and (26) reduce to (7) and (8)
and the total percentage eﬀect of immigrants and emigrants on marginal productivity are as
in (15) and (16). In the short run, however,  may deviate from its long-run equilibrium due
to exogenous migration shocks. In this case the percentage eﬀect on marginal productivity,
included in expressions (17) and (18) of each group, includes an extra term, namely:
b 

(short run) = b 

 +( 1− )b (short run)  =( ) (27)
where b (short run) is the short-run percentage deviation of the capital-labor ratio from ∗
due to exogenous immigration or emigration. Considering immigration27, with immediate
and full capital adjustment, b short run equals 0. At the opposite extreme, with ﬁxed total
capital,  =  then b (short run) is approximately equal to the negative percentage change of
labor supply due to exogenous immigration and emigration which is: −
∆+∆
 ,w h e r e
the numerator is the net change in workers due to the total net immigration and  is,
approximately, the employment at the beginning of the period. While for short periods or
for sudden shocks the short run eﬀect may be evaluated considering capital as ﬁxed in the
case of ten years of immigration, which is a slow and sustained phenomenon, we need to
account explicitly for the dynamics of the capital-labor ratio to recover a short-run eﬀect.
A popular way to analyze the deviation of ln() from its balanced growth path trend,
used in the growth and business cycle literature, is to represent its time-dynamics in the
following way:











,a n dt h et e r m1 ln(−1) captures the sluggishness of yearly capital adjust-
ment. The parameter (1 − 1) is commonly called the “speed of adjustment” since it is the
27The short run eﬀect of exogenous emigration could be accounted similarly. The diﬀerence is that in that
case we should consider actual, rather than exogenous, employment changes. However, in our case, due to
the small values of net emigrants (relative to the total lab or force), we neglect the endogenous employment
response on  in the short-run and we consider only the eﬀect of exogenous emigration on it.
31share of the deviation from the balanced growth path (trend) eliminated each year. Finally,
∆+∆
 represents the yearly net exogenous immigration ﬂo w sa ss h a r eo ft h el a b o rf o r c e
and  are other zero-mean uncorrelated shocks. Once we know 1,  and the sequence of
yearly net immigration ﬂows,
∆+∆
  we can use (28) to obtain an impulse response of
ln() as of 2000 in deviation from its trend (short run).
In order to obtain the short-run eﬀect on native employment and wages of immigration
we need to evaluate the yearly short-run deviation of ln() from its trend due to the net
inﬂows of immigrants
∆+∆
 and correct the marginal productivity eﬀects in by (1 −
)b (short run). When analyzing the short-run eﬀects of immigration it is reasonable to consider
the labor supply as rigid, to be consistent with the optimizing model (which has a rigid labor
supply) and to isolate only this channel.
Simulations For the immigration of the 1990s it is likely that only long-run eﬀects are
left. For the immigration during 2000-2007 there may still be some short-run eﬀects, due to
incomplete capital adjustment, embodied in the current wages. Hence, we use equation (27)
to correct for the short-run impact on marginal productivity of changes in the capital-labor
ratio. We also use equation (28) to calculate the actual deviation of  from the balanced
growth path as a consequence of immigration. To implement (28) we need an estimate of the
speed of convergence of capital. The recent growth literature usually estimates a 10% speed
of convergence of capital to the own balanced growth path for advanced (OECD) economies
(Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996), implying 1 =0 9 and  = −09 in equation (28) which
are the values that we choose28.
We use the immigration rates over 2000-2007 period for the considered countries, and
assume a uniform distribution of migration ﬂows over the seven years. We adopt as pa-
rameters of capital adjustment 1 =0 9 and  = −09 (assuming that capital adjustment
begins the same year as immigrants are received). Hence the recursive equation (28) allows
us to calculate b  as of year 2010. Using formula (27) we adjust the marginal productivity
eﬀect and we include it in (19) to evaluate the short-run wage eﬀects29.F i g u r e sA . 1 . aa n d
A . 1 . bs h o wt h es i m u l a t e dw a g ee ﬀects, using the intermediate parameter scenario. The ﬁgure
includes the previously estimated eﬀects with constant interest rate (thick solid line), the
eﬀect after correcting for downgrading and undocumented (thin solid line) and the short-run
eﬀects (evaluated as of year 2010) obtained after correcting for capital adjustment (dashed
line).
The short-run correction is larger the larger is the total immigration rate. Hence, its
importance is decreasing as we move from left to right in the graph. The short-run wage
eﬀect on less educated is around -1.4% for Spain and -1.9% for Cyprus. Most of the other
eﬀects are very small (less than half a percentage point), while for Luxembourg the positive
eﬀect still dominates. So, even in the short run, less educated experience growth in wages of
more than 2%. For the United States the short run eﬀect on wages of less educated natives
is 0.
28The business cycle literature calculates the speed of convergence of capital to be between 10% and 20%
in each year (Romer, 2006, Chapter 4) for closed economies, and even faster rates for open economies.
29Consistently with short-run analysis we consider rigid labor supply.
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Figure 1: Wage effects of total immigration 1990-2000 on native workers 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by immigration rate) 
 
1.a. Percentage effects of total immigration on less educated native wages 
 
1.b. . Percentage effects of total immigration on average native wages 
 
Note: Values on the vertical axis are the simulated wage effect (in percentage of the initial wage) of immigration 
on natives. We omit Israel and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the chart as they are outliers (see Table A4). 
The parameter values corresponding to the “Pessimistic”, “Intermediate” and “Optimistic” scenarios are reported 
in Table 4. 
  35 
 
Figure 2: Employment effects of total immigration 1990-2000 on native workers 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by immigration rate) 
 
2.a. Percentage effects of total immigration on employment of less educated natives 
 
2.b. Percentage effects of total immigration on employment of all natives 
 
Note: Values on the vertical axis are the simulated aggregate employment effects (in percentage of the initial 
employment) of immigration on natives. We omit Israel and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the chart as they are 
outliers see (Table A5). The parameter values corresponding to the Pessimistic, Intermediate and Optimistic Scenario are 
reported in Table 4.  36 
 
Figure 3: Wage effects of total emigration 1990-2000 on native workers 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by emigration rate of college educated) 
 
3.a. Percentage effects of total emigration on less educated native wages 
 
3.b. Percentage effects of total emigration on average native wages 
 
Note: Values on the vertical axis are the simulated wage effects (in percentage of the initial wage) of emigration on 
natives. We omit Israel from the chart. The parameter values corresponding to the “Pessimistic”, “Intermediate” and 
“Optimistic” scenarios are reported in Table 4. 
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Figure 4: Wage effects of total immigration 1990-2000, accounting for undocumented and downgrading 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by immigration rate) 
 
4.a. Percentage effects of total emigration on less educated native wages 
 
4.b. Percentage effects of total emigration on average native wages 
 
Note: Values on the vertical axis are the simulated wage effects (in percentage of the initial wage) of immigration on 
natives. We omit Israel and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the chart as they are outliers. The parameter values 
corresponding to the “Pessimistic”, “Intermediate” and “Optimistic” scenarios are reported in Table 4. The correction for 
undocumented is done using data from the European Union (2009) dataset. The correction for downgrading uses 
occupational distribution of immigrants by schooling in each country from the OECD DIOC-E database.38 
 
Figure 5: Wage effects of non-OECD immigrants 1990-2000 on native workers 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by immigration rate from non-OECD countries) 
 
5.a. Percentage effects of non-OECD immigrants on less educated native wages 
 
5.b. Percentage effects of non-OECD immigrants on average native wages 
 
Note:  Only the net inflow of immigrants, born in non-OECD countries is included in the analysis. The remaining 
definitions are as in Figure 1. 
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Figure 6: Wage effects of non-OECD immigrants 1990-2000, accounting for undocumented and downgrading 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by non-OECD immigration rate) 
 
6.a. Percentage effects of non-OECD immigrants on less educated native wages 
 
6.b. Percentage effects of non-OECD immigrants on average native wages 
 
Note: Only non-OECD immigrants plus correction for undocumented and downgrading, as in Figure 4. 
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Figure 7: Wage effects in 2000-2007 total immigration on native workers 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by immigration rate - Sample for the US and EU countries) 
 
7.a. Percentage effects of total emigration on less educated native wages 
 
7.b. Percentage effects of total emigration on average native wages 
 
Note: The stock of immigrants and net immigration are calculated using EU Labor Force Survey data for European 
countries and American Community Survey data for the US. The years considered are 2000 and 2007 for the European 
countries and 2000-2009 for the US. We only include European countries with at least 80% of non-missing observations 
for age, schooling and country of birth. 
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Figure A1: Short-run wage effects of 2000-2007 immigration, with undocumented and downgrading 
(Countries ranked left-to-right by immigration rate - Sample for the US and EU countries) 
 
A1.a. Percentage effects of total emigration on less educated native wages 
 
A1.b. Percentage effects of total emigration on average native wages 
 
Note: The short-run (within 2 years) effects are calculated accounting for sluggish capital adjustment over the period 
2000-2007.42 
 
Table 1: Immigration rates 1990-2000 (ranked by total immigration rate) 
Country Total  Immigration 
rates, from all 
countries 
College Educated 









Israel 14.35%  60.19%  15.14%  47.03% 
Luxembourg 12.53%  16.47%  3.03%  2.17% 
Austria 9.35%  7.87% 3.42%  2.11% 
Ireland 7.60%  28.02%  1.65%  6.12% 
United States  5.71%  6.50%  3.40%  4.71% 
New Zealand  5.61%  7.61%  4.79%  8.11% 
Iceland 5.25%  16.44% 2.17%  5.41% 
Canada 5.21%  10.81% 5.59%  9.06% 
Cyprus 4.76%  13.07%  2.50%  5.95% 
Australia 3.79% 13.70%  3.66% 6.82% 
Spain 3.32%  5.80%  2.02%  3.28% 
Malta 2.84%  18.73%  0.59%  4.41% 
Sweden 2.66% 6.63%  2.59%  4.29% 
Germany 2.64%  3.91%  0.90% 1.65% 
Belgium 2.63% 5.68%  1.69%  2.40% 
Denmark 2.54%  2.95%  1.82% 1.57% 
Netherlands 2.39%  6.60%  1.77%  3.16% 
United Kingdom  2.13%  11.26%  1.64%  6.13% 
Finland 1.74%  2.34% 0.65%  0.70% 
Switzerland 1.61%  9.29%  2.63%  2.96% 
Portugal 1.55% 2.99%  1.23%  1.76% 
Bulgaria 1.06% 2.52%  0.62%  1.56% 
Italy 1.00%  1.08%  0.73%  0.57% 
France 0.81%  3.38% 1.01%  1.89% 
Turkey 0.71%  7.10% 0.06%  1.27% 
Japan 0.46%  0.78%  0.39%  0.54% 
Czech Republic  0.39%  5.35%  0.07%  1.02% 
Slovakia 0.35% 1.24%  0.08%  0.29% 
Greece 0.24%  0.34% 0.19%  0.21% 
Chile 0.13%  0.26%  0.12%  0.15% 
Mexico 0.11%  1.09% 0.03%  0.36% 
Korea 0.00%  0.15%  0.00%  0.11% 
Romania -0.04%  0.27%  -0.02% 0.13% 
Slovenia -0.09% 1.31%  -0.08%  0.84% 
Hungary -0.12% 0.17%  -0.03%  0.04% 
Poland -1.14%  -0.87% -0.77%  -0.63% 
Lithuania -2.96%  0.36%  -2.71% 0.34% 
Latvia -15.58%  -17.93%  -16.88%  -19.79% 




Table 2: Emigration rates 1990-2000, total and for college graduates (Ranked by college-emigration rates) 
Country Total  College  graduates 
Cyprus 1.78%  29.31% 
Malta -1.77%  27.99% 
Ireland -4.23%  23.30% 
Mexico 11.58%  19.76% 
New Zealand  6.82%  16.85% 
Portugal 3.09%  12.57% 
Estonia 4.89%  9.89% 
Romania 1.23%  9.89% 
Latvia 2.42%  9.17% 
Slovenia 4.90%  9.15% 
Slovakia 1.04%  8.74% 
Poland 0.49%  8.32% 
Korea 1.76%  8.20% 
Lithuania 0.76%  7.51% 
Bulgaria 2.50%  7.19% 
United Kingdom  0.40%  6.36% 
Iceland 2.68%  5.99% 
Turkey 2.43%  5.57% 
Greece 0.25%  4.57% 
Chile 1.24%  4.05% 
Luxembourg 0.73%  3.92% 
Switzerland 2.13%  3.64% 
Finland 0.02%  2.95% 
Netherlands 0.61%  2.94% 
Spain 0.06%  2.92% 
Belgium 0.51%  2.91% 
Sweden 0.82%  2.30% 
Denmark 0.30%  2.22% 
Austria 0.32%  2.03% 
Australia 1.07%  1.70% 
Canada 0.17%  1.65% 
Italy -0.29%  1.63% 
Czech Republic  0.74%  1.48% 
Germany 0.20%  1.37% 
France 0.44%  1.31% 
Hungary 0.04%  0.37% 
Japan 0.06%  0.36% 
United States  0.10% 0.23% 
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σq,  Elasticity of Substitution between more and less educated  1.3  1.75  2.00 
σm:  Elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives  infinite  20  6 
λ:  Intensity of college externalities  0  0.45  0.75 
γ:  Elasticity of labor supply  0.2  0.1  0 
 
 
Table 4: Foreign-born in aggregate OECD countries 
OECD as receiving countries  All 




(Foreign-born/Total) in 2000  7.73%  6.95%  9.74% 
(non OECD- born)/Total in 2000  3.78%  3.17%  5.38% 
(net inflow 1990-2000)/ Total 2000  2.41%  1.53%  5.46% 
(net inflow 1990-2000 from non-OECD)/ Total 2000  1.52%  0.93%  3.54% 
 
 
















Note: the 2000-07 figures are obtained as our elaborations from the EULFS 
data for the European countries, and using the ACS data for the US. The US 




Country 1990-2000  2000-2007 
Cyprus 4.76%  11.31% 
Spain 3.32%  11.26% 
Luxembourg 12.53%  8.46% 
Austria 9.35%  5.06% 
United States  5.71%  3.76% 
Sweden 2.66%  3.66% 
Denmark 2.54%  2.86% 
Portugal 1.55%  2.81% 
Finland 1.74%  2.68% 
Greece 0.24%  2.46% 
France 0.81%  1.26% 
Belgium 2.63%  0.39% 
Netherlands 2.39%  -0.45% 























OECD destinations (30/30)  28.5  12.3  40.8  37.1  20.3  57.4 
Observed non-OECD destinations 
(31/46) 
12.5 1.5  14.0  17.1 3.1  20.2 
Imputed non OECD destinations 
(134/119) 
22.9 2.5  25.4  20.1 2.8  22.9 
Total (195/195)  63.9  16.3  80.2  74.3  26.2  100.5
 
Note: The data are from the Docquier et al (2010) database. It expands the OECD data of Docquier and Marfouk (2006) 
to 31 and 46 non-OECD countries (for 1990 and 2000 respectively) and imputed data on migrant stocks for the 
remaining of 195 countries covering the whole world.  46 
 
Table A2: Stock of emigrants in 1990 and 2000 (x 1,000):  Observed and imputed values 
1990 2000 
   Total  Observed  Imputed  Imputed/tot Total Observed  Imputed  Imputed/tot 
Australia 163.9  147.1  16.7  0.102  242.7  227.4  15.3  0.063 
Austria 414.7  395.3  19.4  0.047  430.2  386.2  43.9  0.102 
Belgium 337.4  293.8  43.7  0.129  368.2  328.0  40.1  0.109 
Bulgaria 422.2  393.7  28.6  0.068  564.3  540.0  24.3  0.043 
Canada 856.7  846.6  10.1  0.012  880.9  874.7  6.3  0.007 
Cyprus 109.7  109.4  0.3  0.003  116.5  116.5  0.0  0.000 
Chile 169.0  163.7  5.3  0.032  252.3  247.9  4.5  0.018 
Czech Republic  171.6  169.3  2.3  0.014  217.2  215.4  1.8  0.008 
Denmark 160.6  160.1  0.5  0.003 170.8  169.0 1.8  0.010 
Estonia  61.7 37.3 24.4 0.396 91.6 61.7 29.9 0.327 
Finland 270.2  270.2  0.0  0.000  270.8  270.8  0.0  0.000 
France 1,001.7  697.4  304.2  0.304  1,148.6  917.4  231.2  0.201 
Germany 2,448.6  2,359.0  89.6  0.037  2,554.5  2,451.8  102.7  0.040 
Greece  861.1 756.8 104.3  0.121  876.4 757.1 119.2  0.136 
Hungary 339.1  332.3  6.8  0.020  342.0  325.6  16.4  0.048 
Iceland 14.7  14.7  0.0  0.000  18.4  18.4  0.0  0.000 
Ireland 766.5  745.6  20.9  0.027  689.1  686.6  2.5  0.004 
Israel  298.7 114.2 184.5  0.618  419.2 157.8 261.4  0.624 
Italy 2,714.3  2,660.0  54.3  0.020  2,604.9  2,548.6  56.3  0.022 
Japan 458.0  444.3  13.8  0.030  509.4  488.9  20.5  0.040 
Korea 859.7  838.5  21.2  0.025  1,264.0  1,225.5  38.6  0.031 
Latvia 90.4  55.7  34.6  0.383  116.6  77.5  39.1  0.335 
Lithuania 251.8  183.6  68.2  0.271  267.3  205.9  61.4  0.230 
Luxembourg 23.8  23.8  0.0  0.000  25.2  25.2  0.0  0.000 
Malta 99.6  99.6  0.0  0.000  95.8  95.5  0.3  0.003 
Mexico 2,725.2  2,693.8  31.4  0.012  6,502.1  6,457.5  44.6  0.007 
Netherlands 589.1  574.7  14.3  0.024  639.7  625.5  14.2  0.022 
New Zealand  258.2  246.4  11.9  0.046  370.3  358.5  11.8  0.032 
Poland 1,309.8  1,194.4  115.4  0.088  1,419.2  1,269.2  150.0  0.106 
Portugal 1,256.4  1,160.8  95.6  0.076  1,450.4  1,315.4  135.0  0.093 
Romania 464.6  462.0  2.6  0.006  633.8  621.2  12.6  0.020 
Slovakia 350.8  342.3  8.5  0.024  383.3  378.5  4.8  0.013 
Slovenia 74.4  74.4  0.0  0.000  127.6  127.6  0.0  0.000 
Spain 959.4  897.6  61.9  0.064  973.3  924.7  48.6  0.050 
Sweden 138.9  135.5  3.4  0.025  182.2  174.7  7.4  0.041 
Switzerland 180.1  172.0  8.1  0.045  256.5  236.4  20.1  0.078 
Turkey 1,517.9  1,488.0  29.9  0.020  2,117.5  2,082.2  35.3  0.017 
United Kingdom  3,302.9  3,070.0  232.9  0.071  3,442.6  3,260.4  182.2  0.053 
United States  757.2  676.4  80.8  0.107  900.6  838.3  62.3  0.069 
Note:  The observed emigrants are in one of the 30 OECD countries or one of the 46 (in 2000) or 31 (in1990) non-OECD countries for 
which we have data. The procedure to impute data is described in detail in the Data Appendix of the paper. 
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Table A3: Wage income share of each group, sh(i,j) 
 
Country  sh (h,n)  sh (h,f)  sh (l,n)  sh (l,f) 
Australia 0.232  0.143  0.437 0.188 
Austria 0.237  0.007  0.706  0.051 
Belgium 0.278  0.018 0.614 0.089 
Bulgaria 0.211  0.001 0.786 0.002 
Canada 0.362  0.132 0.403  0.104 
Chile 0.165  0.000  0.833  0.002 
Cyprus 0.179  0.029  0.756  0.036 
Czech Republic  0.106  0.003  0.838  0.053 
Denmark 0.233  0.005  0.738  0.024 
Estonia 0.061  0.148  0.523  0.268 
Finland 0.276  0.002  0.716  0.006 
France 0.276  0.010  0.650  0.064 
Germany 0.258  0.010  0.696  0.037 
Greece 0.140  0.014  0.793  0.053 
Hungary 0.150  0.001  0.842 0.007 
Iceland 0.155  0.020  0.776  0.049 
Ireland 0.202  0.028  0.722  0.048 
Israel 0.243 0.090  0.275  0.392 
Italy 0.185  0.003  0.800  0.012 
Japan 0.283 0.002  0.710  0.005 
Korea 0.224 0.002  0.771  0.003 
Latvia 0.096 0.082  0.516  0.306 
Lithuania 0.145  0.024  0.737  0.095 
Luxembourg 0.226  0.058  0.518  0.198 
Malta 0.076 0.035  0.856  0.033 
Mexico 0.143  0.002  0.852  0.003 
Netherlands 0.207  0.035  0.633  0.125 
New Zealand  0.165  0.116  0.604  0.115 
Poland 0.126  0.007  0.832  0.035 
Portugal 0.156  0.003  0.835 0.006 
Romania 0.097  0.003  0.897 0.004 
Slovakia 0.126  0.000 0.872 0.001 
Slovenia 0.141  0.020 0.737 0.102 
Spain 0.169 0.008  0.800  0.024 
Sweden 0.246  0.018 0.669  0.068 
Switzerland 0.232  0.051  0.538  0.179 
Turkey 0.075  0.004  0.903  0.018 
United 
Kingdom 0.221  0.019  0.715 0.045 
United States  0.443  0.039  0.480  0.038 
 
Note: The share of wage income to each group  are calculated using employment from Docquier et al. (2010), data on 
return to schooling from Hendricks (2004) and data on native-immigrant premium from Kerr and Kerr (2009). 48 
 
 
Table A4: Simulated effects of immigrants on wages of less educated and average wages of natives 
 













Luxembourg -0.01%  0.97%  2.75% 0.96% 1.77%  3.28%
Austria 0.00%  0.34%  1.33% -0.27% 0.12%  1.18%
Ireland 0.41%  2.00%  3.95% 3.90% 4.87%  5.87%
United States  0.02%  0.37%  1.03% 0.33% 0.63%  1.20%
New Zealand  0.12%  0.61%  1.46% 0.47% 0.89%  1.65%
Iceland 0.13%  0.95%  1.87% 1.13% 1.78%  2.42%
Canada 0.20%  1.49%  2.90% 3.43% 4.13%  4.65%
Cyprus 0.19%  0.95%  1.92% 1.38% 1.94%  2.58%
Australia 0.32%  1.82%  3.23% 3.71% 4.58%  5.06%
Spain 0.03%  0.32%  0.81% 0.34% 0.57%  0.98%
Malta 0.37%  0.99%  1.66% 1.26% 1.72%  2.14%
Sweden 0.03%  0.51%  1.05% 0.74% 1.09%  1.44%
Germany 0.01%  0.23%  0.57% 0.23% 0.41%  0.69%
Belgium 0.01%  0.43%  0.98% 0.78% 1.07%  1.41%
Denmark 0.01%  0.13%  0.38% 0.06% 0.17%  0.40%
Netherlands 0.03%  0.49%  1.04% 0.83% 1.15%  1.47%
United Kingdom  0.11%  0.81%  1.52% 1.46% 1.93%  2.26%
Finland 0.01%  0.15%  0.39% 0.14% 0.25%  0.46%
Switzerland -0.03%  0.74%  1.48% 1.72% 2.17%  2.44%
Portugal 0.02%  0.15%  0.39% 0.17% 0.28%  0.47%
Bulgaria 0.02%  0.16%  0.35% 0.23% 0.34%  0.47%
Italy 0.00%  0.06%  0.18% 0.01% 0.07%  0.19%
France 0.01%  0.28%  0.55% 0.50% 0.68%  0.82%
Turkey 0.04%  0.21%  0.40% 0.37% 0.48%  0.58%
Japan 0.00%  0.06%  0.13% 0.07% 0.11%  0.17%
Czech Republic  0.02%  0.22%  0.40% 0.38% 0.52%  0.60%
Slovakia 0.01%  0.06%  0.13% 0.08% 0.12%  0.17%
Greece 0.00%  0.02%  0.05% 0.01% 0.03%  0.06%
Chile 0.00%  0.01%  0.03% 0.02% 0.03%  0.04%
Mexico 0.01%  0.05%  0.10% 0.10% 0.13%  0.15%
Korea 0.00%  0.01%  0.02% 0.03% 0.03%  0.03%
Romania 0.00%  0.01%  0.01% 0.02% 0.03%  0.02%
Slovenia 0.01%  0.07%  0.11% 0.16% 0.19%  0.19%
Hungary 0.00%  0.01%  0.00% 0.03% 0.03%  0.02%
Poland 0.00%  -0.04%  -0.17% 0.02% -0.02%  -0.15%
Lithuania 0.03%  0.07%  -0.14% 0.41% 0.38%  0.07%
Latvia -0.05%  -0.98%  -2.91% -0.32% -1.19%  -3.06%
Estonia -0.65%  -2.14%  -4.48% -1.33% -2.69%  -4.84%
Israel -4.80%  1.39%  8.03% 12.99% 15.85%  17.56%49 
 
Table A5: Simulated employment effects of immigration on less educated and all natives 
 
 














Luxembourg 0.04%  0.11%  0.00%  0.19%  0.18%  0.00% 
Austria -0.01%  0.03%  0.00%  -0.05%  0.01%  0.00% 
Ireland 0.34%  0.30%  0.00%  0.78%  0.49%  0.00% 
United States  0.01%  0.04%  0.00%  0.07%  0.06%  0.00% 
New Zealand  0.04%  0.07%  0.00% 0.09%  0.09%  0.00% 
Iceland 0.07%  0.11%  0.00%  0.23%  0.18%  0.00% 
Canada 0.11%  0.18%  0.00%  0.69%  0.41%  0.00% 
Cyprus 0.09%  0.12%  0.00%  0.28%  0.19%  0.00% 
Australia 0.18%  0.23%  0.00%  0.74%  0.46%  0.00% 
Spain 0.03%  0.04%  0.00%  0.07%  0.06%  0.00% 
Malta 0.13%  0.12%  0.00%  0.25%  0.17%  0.00% 
Sweden 0.03%  0.06%  0.00%  0.15%  0.11%  0.00% 
Germany 0.01%  0.03%  0.00%  0.05%  0.04%  0.00% 
Belgium 0.04%  0.06%  0.00%  0.16%  0.11%  0.00% 
Denmark 0.00%  0.01%  0.00%  0.01%  0.02%  0.00% 
Netherlands 0.04%  0.06%  0.00%  0.17%  0.11%  0.00% 
United Kingdom  0.11%  0.12%  0.00%  0.29%  0.19%  0.00% 
Finland 0.01%  0.02%  0.00%  0.03%  0.02%  0.00% 
Switzerland 0.09%  0.11%  0.00%  0.34%  0.22%  0.00% 
Portugal 0.02%  0.02%  0.00%  0.03%  0.03%  0.00% 
Bulgaria 0.02%  0.02%  0.00%  0.05%  0.03%  0.00% 
Italy 0.00%  0.01%  0.00%  0.00%  0.01%  0.00% 
France 0.02%  0.04%  0.00%  0.10%  0.07%  0.00% 
Turkey 0.03%  0.03%  0.00% 0.07%  0.05%  0.00% 
Japan 0.00%  0.01%  0.00%  0.01%  0.01%  0.00% 
Czech Republic  0.02%  0.03%  0.00%  0.08%  0.05%  0.00% 
Slovakia 0.01%  0.01%  0.00%  0.02%  0.01%  0.00% 
Greece 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Chile 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Mexico 0.01%  0.01%  0.00%  0.02%  0.01%  0.00% 
Korea 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.01%  0.00%  0.00% 
Romania 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Slovenia 0.01%  0.01%  0.00%  0.03%  0.02%  0.00% 
Hungary 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.01%  0.00%  0.00% 
Poland 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Lithuania 0.03%  0.02%  0.00%  0.08%  0.04%  0.00% 
Latvia -0.02%  -0.10%  0.00%  -0.06%  -0.12%  0.00% 
Estonia -0.17%  -0.23%  0.00%  -0.27%  -0.27%  0.00% 
Israel -0.25%  0.43%  0.00%  2.60%  1.59%  0.00% 
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Table A6:  Simulated Wage Effects of Emigration 
Country 













Cyprus -6.81%  -5.93%  -4.54%  -3.52%  -2.30%  -0.37% 
Malta -3.47%  -3.03%  -2.35%  -2.00%  -1.50%  -0.62% 
Ireland -6.59%  -5.90%  -4.84%  -3.01%  -1.92%  -0.25% 
Mexico -1.29% -1.13%  -0.87%  -0.63% -0.39%  -0.01% 
New Zealand  -3.99%  -3.47%  -2.60%  -2.11%  -1.65%  -0.61% 
Portugal -1.50%  -1.35% -1.11% -0.68%  -0.41%  -0.01% 
Estonia -1.56% -1.45%  -1.15%  -0.73% -0.84%  -0.57% 
Romania -0.92%  -0.80%  -0.62% -0.46%  -0.28%  -0.01% 
Latvia -1.54%  -1.36%  -1.05%  -0.65%  -0.51%  -0.12% 
Slovenia -0.74%  -0.71% -0.58%  -0.29%  -0.21%  0.00% 
Slovakia -1.09% -0.95% -0.72%  -0.55% -0.33%  0.00% 
Poland -1.10%  -0.97%  -0.77%  -0.53%  -0.32%  -0.01% 
Korea -1.62%  -1.44%  -1.15%  -0.76%  -0.46%  -0.01% 
Lithuania -1.32%  -1.15%  -0.88% -0.64%  -0.40%  -0.02% 
Bulgaria -1.13% -1.00% -0.78%  -0.54% -0.33%  0.00% 
United 
Kingdom -1.59%  -1.42%  -1.15% -0.72%  -0.44%  -0.02% 
Iceland -0.74% -0.66%  -0.51%  -0.36% -0.24%  -0.03% 
Turkey -0.25%  -0.22%  -0.18%  -0.11%  -0.07%  0.00% 
Greece -0.73%  -0.64%  -0.50%  -0.36%  -0.22%  -0.01% 
Chile -0.53%  -0.46%  -0.35%  -0.26%  -0.16%  0.00% 
Luxembourg -1.23%  -1.06%  -0.82%  -0.51%  -0.29%  0.06% 
Switzerland -0.61%  -0.58%  -0.48%  -0.21%  -0.14%  0.03% 
Finland -0.96% -0.85%  -0.68%  -0.44% -0.27% 0.00% 
Netherlands -0.72%  -0.63%  -0.48%  -0.33%  -0.20%  0.01% 
Spain -0.53%  -0.47%  -0.38%  -0.25%  -0.15%  0.00% 
Belgium -0.90% -0.79% -0.63%  -0.39% -0.22%  0.03% 
Sweden -0.53% -0.46% -0.36%  -0.25% -0.15% 0.01% 
Denmark -0.57%  -0.50%  -0.38% -0.28%  -0.17%  0.00% 
Austria -0.50%  -0.44%  -0.34%  -0.23%  -0.13% 0.01% 
Australia -0.44%  -0.40%  -0.32% -0.17%  -0.13%  -0.02% 
Canada -1.18% -1.04%  -0.86%  -0.50% -0.32%  -0.04% 
Italy -0.42%  -0.36%  -0.28%  -0.21%  -0.12%  0.00% 
Czech 
Republic -0.09%  -0.08%  -0.06% -0.04%  -0.03%  0.00% 
Germany -0.40%  -0.35%  -0.27% -0.19%  -0.11%  0.00% 
France -0.31%  -0.28%  -0.22%  -0.14%  -0.08%  0.01% 
Hungary -0.05%  -0.05% -0.04% -0.02%  -0.01%  0.00% 
Japan -0.10%  -0.09%  -0.07%  -0.05%  -0.03%  0.00% 
United States  -0.10%  -0.09%  -0.08%  -0.04%  -0.02%  0.00% 
Israel 1.42%  0.51%  0.11%  0.86%  0.25%  -0.04% 
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Table A7: Estimates of Share of undocumented immigrants, by country as of 2000 
 
                                          Estimated undocumented as share of total immigrants 
Country  Lower bound  Upper bound  Source of the estimates 
Australia  0 0  Census includes undocumented
Austria  0.03 0.09 From Clandestino
Belgium  0.03 0.06 as Germany
Bulgaria  0.06 0.37 as Poland
Canada  0.00 0.00 Census includes undocumented
Cyprus  0.17 0.23 as Greece
Czech Republic  0.30 0.30 from Clandestino
Denmark  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
Estonia  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
Finland  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
France  0.04 0.08 from Clandestino
Germany  0.03 0.06 from Clandestino
Greece  0.17 0.23 from Clandestino
Hungary  0.09 0.14 from Clandestino
Ireland  0.06 0.10 as UK
Italy  0.27 0.33 from Clandestino
Latvia  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
Lithuania  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
Luxembourg  0.03 0.06 as Germany
Malta  0.17 0.23 as Greece
Netherlands  0.04 0.09 from Clandestino
New Zealand  0.00 0.00 Census includes undocumented
Poland  0.06 0.37 from Clandestino
Portugal  0.09 0.09 as Spain
Romania  0.06 0.37 as Poland
Slovakia  0.12 0.22 from Clandestino
Slovenia  0.03 0.09 as Austria
Spain  0.09 0.09 from Clandestino
Sweden  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
United Kingdom  0.06 0.10 from Clandestino
United States  0.00 0.10 Census includes undocumented, but possibly undercounted
Chile  0.07 0.14 set to the average for lack of information 
Iceland  0.04 0.09 as Netherlands
Israel  0.17 0.23 as Greece
Japan  0.07 0.14 set to the average for lack of information 
Korea  0.07 0.14 set to the average for lack of information 
Mexico  0.00 0.10 census includes undocumented, but possibly undercounted
Switzerland  0.03 0.09 as Austria
Turkey  0.17 0.23 as Greece
Note: the source “Clandestino” is European Union (2009). The other countries are given the estimates relative to a 
neighbor. 
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Table A8: Estimates of The downgrading factors, based on occupations, for highly educated immigrants, by 
country, as of 2000 
 
Country  Share of college educated 
immigrants to be counted as 
college educated natives  (τ) 
Share of college educated 
immigrants to be counted as less 
educated natives (1−τ) 
Australia 0.86  0.14 
Austria 0.93  0.07 
Belgium 0.95  0.05 
Bulgaria 0.88  0.12 
Canada 0.95  0.05 
Chile 0.55  0.45 
Cyprus 0.60  0.40 
Denmark 0.65  0.35 
Estonia 0.65  0.35 
Finland 0.83  0.17 
France 0.97  0.03 
Germany 0.88  0.12 
Greece 0.60  0.40 
Hungary 0.95  0.05 
Ireland 0.98  0.02 
Israel 0.58  0.42 
Italy 0.85 0.15 
Latvia 0.79  0.21 
Lithuania 0.74  0.26 
Luxembourg 0.94  0.06 
Malta 0.85  0.15 
Mexico 1.40  -0.40 
Netherlands 0.84  0.16 
New Zealand  1.17  -0.17 
Poland 1.02  -0.02 
Portugal 0.91  0.09 
Romania 1.10  -0.10 
Slovakia 0.80  0.20 
Slovenia 0.84  0.16 
Spain 0.85  0.15 
Sweden 0.66  0.34 
Switzerland 0.89  0.11 
United Kingdom  0.96  0.04 
United States  0.95  0.05 
 